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SEX OFFENSES:. THE AMERICAN LEGAL CONTEXT
Moiuus PLOSCOWE*
A rational code of sex offense laws is long overdue in this country. Sex offense
legislation presently on the books is largely unenforceable and much of this legisla-
tion does a great deal more harm than good. There are a number of fundamental
reasons for this. In the first plac&, the prohibitions imposed by these laws are far
too inclusive, covering far too many areas of sexual behavior. These laws make
potential criminals of most of the adolescent and adult population, in that they
proscribe every conceivable sexual act except a normal act of coitus between a man
and a woman who are married to each other or an act of solitary masturbation. They,
of course, prohibit not only the more innocuous kinds of sexual behavior engaged in
by normal adults and adolescents, but also aberrant sexual behavior that may be
dangerous. Thus, not only heavy necking, mutual masturbation, fornication, and
adultery, but also forcible rape, forcible sodomy, incest, and the sexual abuse of small
children are interdicted by these laws.
One goal of sex offense laws is to keep individuals chaste before marriage. Until
then, individuals must not give overt expression to any sexual desires, except possibly
through solitary masturbation; sex drives must be kept in check, under pain of
incarceration.
After marriage, too, the law attempts to confine sexual activity. Thus, a married
individual may not look for sexual liaison with other than his or her spouse, however
embittered or distasteful their relations may have become. And should his or her
spouse be in jail, in the country or overseas, or living separate and apart, a married
individual must figuratively fasten on a chastity belt. Adultery may open the door
to the penitentiary.
Nor is adultery the only invitation to sanctions for married individuals. Since
time immemorial, men and women have engaged in what are politely called
aberrant sex practices; nor are many of them-for example, oral-genital contacts-the
exclusive usages of homosexuals and lesbians, but commonly may be indulged
in a normal marital relationship. Indeed, most modern marriage manuals no longer
view such practices with alarm as perversions, but rather consider them to be per-
missible preludes to normal coitus. The law, however, usually takes a different view
and subjects participants in such acts to a possible felony conviction.
When American sex offense legislation is compared with the analogous law of
Tudor England, one cannot but conclude that the modern American is considerably
*A.B. 1925, LL.B. 1931, Harvard University. Member of the NeW'York bar; Adjunct Associate
Vtotessor of Law, New York University; *Associate Reporter, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code.
New York City Magistrate, 1945-53. Author, SEx AND TnE LAw (1951), THE TRtirr~ Aaotrr DrvoRcjs
(1955). and other publications.
2x8 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
more naive than were his English ancestors. Only a small part of the sexual be-
havior legally proscribed here today was prohibited by the criminal law of Tudor
England. Forcible rape, sexual intercourse with a female under ten, the sexual
corruption of children, lewd and indecent acts in public, bestiality, buggery, the
maintenance of houses of prostitution, too, might be punishable under the old Eng-
lish criminal law; but large areas of sexual behavior-for example, fornication,
adultery, incest, fellatio, cunnilingus, mutual masturbation-were beyond the reach
of the law and were punishable only as sins or ecclesiastical offenses by the Church of
England. Since the ecclesiastical courts were not received in this country, our laws,
therefore, initially provided no institutionalized means for dealing with sexual
behavior that had been ignored by the common law. But the lacunae did not long
remain, for legislators, prodded by moralistic constituents, rushed to fill these gaps.
And, as we have seen, they have succeeded only too well.
It was apparent to most serious observers long before the Kinsey studies' that
our sex offense laws were honored more in the breach than in the observance. Few
branches of the law have shown such a wide divergence between actual human
behavior and stated legal norms. Nor should this be surprising. Sexuality simply
cannot realistically be confined within present legal bounds. It does not mysteriously
blossom when a man and a woman are united in holy matrimony; nor, despite
legal prohibitions, is it thereafter restricted to conventional acts of coition between
marital partners.
The wide-ranging character of the prohibitions of sex offense laws and the almost
universal disregard that they are accorded elicited the following biting comment
and criticism from Dr. Kinsey:2
All of these and still other types of sexual behavior are illicit activities, each perform-
ance of which is punishable as a crime under the law. The persons involved in these
activities, taken as a whole, constitute more than 95 per cent of the total male population.
Only a relatively small proportion of the males who are sent to penal institutions for sex
offenses have been involved in behavior which is materially diflerent from the behavior
of most of the males in the population. But it is the total 95 per cent of the male
population for which the judge or board of public safety, or church, or civic group de-
mands apprehension, arrest, and conviction, when they call for a clean-up of the sex
offenders in a community. It is, in fine, a proposal that 5 per cent of the population should
support the other 95 per cent in penal institutions.
The writer has pointed out elsewhere' that this conclusion that ninety-five per
cent of the male population could be jailed because of violations of sex offense laws
is an exaggeration. It presupposes that such legislation is uniform throughout the
country, that all sexual activity except solitary masturbation and normal marital
'ALFRED C. KINSEY, WVARDELL POMEROY & CLYDE E. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE
(1948); ALFRED C. KINSEY, WARDELL B. POMEROY, CLYDE E. MARTIN & PAUL H. GEBHuARD, SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953).
2 ALFRED C. KINSEY, WARDELL B. POMsEROY & CLYDE E. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
MALE 392 (1948). (Emphasis added.)
'MORRIS PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 137 (195i).
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intercourse is universally prohibited, and that these laws invariably prescribe jail
and prison sentences for their violation. This, however, is not so. One of the most
remarkable features of American sex offense laws is their wide disparity in types
of sexual behavior prohibited and their extraordinary variation in penalties imposed
for similar offenses.
Fornication, a common form of premarital sexual activity, is prohibited by a
majority of state laws; but it is deemed only a meretricious transaction in many
states4 and is there beyond the reach of police, prosecuting attorneys, and jailers
Where fornication is prohibited, penalties provided by law vary from a ten-dollar
fine in Rhode Island' to a three-year prison sentence in Arizona 7
Adultery is more widely prohibited than fornication, although the prohibition is
by no means universal But among the states that do prohibit it, the same kinds
of sexual misbehavior are not necessarily encompassed. In some states, a single
act of coitus between a married individual and one who is not his or her spouse
constitutes culpable adultery;' in others, however, the adultery must be "open and
notorious" or "habitual" before the criminal statute is deemed violated.' In some
states, an unmarried party to such a connection is deemed to be guilty of adultery;"-
in others, however, he or she would seem to be guilty of no more than fornication.
Generally, penalties for adultery are more severe than those for fornication, but
they also vary considerably. Some states impose no penalties of imprisonment for
adultery and make this offense punishable only by a fine;12 in others, however,
penalties of up to five years of imprisonment may be meted out for this offense.'-
The crime of rape also differs greatly among the several states. In all states, it
embraces much more than the forcible violation of the sexual integrity of a female,
including as well conduct to which the female may have consented. In this latter
'See, e.g., Rachel v. State, 71 Okla. Cr. 33, X07 P.2d 813 (i94o).
In at least xo states.-Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Vermonit, and Washington-fornication is not statutorily proscribed.0R. I. GEN. IAws ANN. § xx-6-3 (1956).
'AUz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-222 (x956). For a summary survey of the penalties imposed by the
fornication statutes of the several states, see ROBERT VaIT SHERWIN, S.X AND THE STAT TO RY LAW pt. I,
chart 5, at 83 (949).
' In at least five states-Arkansas, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, and Tennessee-adultery is not
statutorily proscribed.
See, e.g., People v. Reed, 246 App. Div. 895 (N.Y. 4 th Dep't 1936).
" See, e.g., Warner v. State, 2o2 Ind. 479, 483, 175 N.E. 661, 663 (X933): "- - • it is well settled
that our present statute does not prohibit . . . acts 'of adulterous intercourse . . . of an occasional char-
acter, unaccompanied by any pretense of the parties living together.' . . . The design of this law is not
to affix a penalty for the violation of the Seventh Commandment, but to punish those who, without
lawful marriage, live together in the manner of husband and wife." Cf. State v. Chandler, 132 Mo. 155,
33 S.W. 797 (x896).
"E.g., N.Y. PEN. LAW § o0.
"These fines range from a minimum of Sio in Maryland, Mn. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 4 (1957); to 3
possible maximum of $2,ooo in Michigan. MicH. CoMp. LAws §§ 750.30, 750.503 (1948).
"'E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 53-218 (1958); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 134, § 1 (1954); OsLt.
STAT. tit. 21, § 872 (i95i); S.D. CODE § 3892 (1939); VT. STAT. tit. 13, ch. 5, § 2o (1958). For a
summary survey of the penalties imposed by the adultery statutes of the several states, see SHERWIN, op.
cit. stepra note 7, pt. a, chart 7, at 85.
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connection, it should be noted that the age over which a female is regarded capable
of consenting to coitus varies widely. The common-law age of consent of ten years
has been discarded by modern statutes. An age limit of sixteen or eighteen years
is now most common, although some states place it as low as twelve years,14 and
another, going to the other extreme, places it at twenty-one years."
Other differences in the definition of rape and in the scope of its statutory pro-
hibition may also be noted. In some states, the lack of chastity of an underage female
may be a defense to the charge of rape; 16 in others, however, a conviction may still
be had even if she was operating as a prostitute 17 Some states, also, make allowance
for the age of the male,' 8 but most statutes are silent on this point. Moreover, in
addition to such wide substantive differences as these among the several states as
to what constitutes rape, there is also considerable disparity as to penalties. Death or
life imprisonment may await a rapist in some states; other states, however, taking
a more charitable view of his dereliction, may impose varying terms of imprison-
ment?
Modern crime-against-nature and sodomy statutes and those interdicting lewd
and lascivious behavior include most deviate sexual activity within the scope of their
prohibitions. Nevertheless, there are differences here, too, among the several states,
especially in the treatment of mutual male masturbation. This conduct is prohibited
in many states, whether it occurs publicly or privately; in some, however, it is pro-
hibited only if it occurs in a public place? ° Penalties under sodomy and crime-
against-nature statutes vary enormously as well. Thus, a consensual homosexual
act between adults is only a misdemeanor in New York; 2' but it may be punishable
by life imprisonment in some states,22 a five-year minimum imprisonment in others,23
and a five-year maximum imprisonment in still others 4
Even the age-old offense of prostitution shows considerable variation in treat-
ment. Most statutes define prostitution as the indiscriminate offer by a female of her
body for sexual intercourse or other lewdness, for the purpose of gain or hire; but in
many states, indiscriminate and promiscuous sexual intercourse, even without gain
"E.g., ALA. CODE it. 14, § 398 (1940); LA. Rav. STAT. § 14:41 (950).
15 E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3706 (1955).
"
8 E.g., N.C. GEr. STAT. § 14-26 (x953); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3706 (x955); W. VA. CODE ch. 6,
art. 2, § 15 (1931).
"' See, e.g., State v. Snow, 252 S.W. 629 (Mo. Sup. Ct. z923).
"E.g., N.Y. PEN. LAw § 2oo; S.C. CODE § iiii (1952).
" For a summary survey of the penalties imposed by the rape statutes of the several states, see
SHERwIN, op. cit. supra note 7, Pt. I, chart 5, at 85.
"0 E.g., N.Y. PEN. LAw § 722(8).
'Id. § 69o.
"E.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 2OI.190 (1958); Mics. CoMr. LAws § 750.158 (1948).
'E.g., Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-651 (1956); IDAHO CODE ANN. § i8-66o5 (1948); MONT. C(Yas
REv. ANN. § 94-4118 (947); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1943); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-707 (1956).2
'E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 436.o5o (x955); LA. REv'. STAT. § 14:89 (195o); N.H. REv. STAr. ANN,
§,.579:9 (9.55); Wis. STAT. § 944.17 (1957). For a'summary gurvey of the penalties imposed by the
sodomy statutes of the several states, see SHERWIN, op. c't. supra note 7, pt. r, chart 4, at 82.
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or hire, may be prostitution. 5 Many states, moreover, make it possible to punish the
customers of prostitutes, as well, either directly by specific statutory provisions' 6 or
indirectly by an extension of aiding-and-abetting statutes; 27 but other states refuse
to punish customers, even though there can be no prostitution without them. While
prostitutes are generally punishable by imprisonment of less than one year, there
are notable exceptions, with maximum sentences running from thirty days28 to five
years.
The fact that sex offender laws vary so widely among the several states and value
judgments as to the danger of similar offenses differ so greatly (as reflected in the
range of penalties imposed) is a compelling reason for framing a rational uniform
code in this area. We are not a congeries of individual states, each isolated within
a water-tight compartment. Modern means of transportation and communication
have made state boundaries largely meaningless. American men and women are
continually upon the move. They should not be exposed to the risk of being
branded felons in one state for sexual behavior that may be legally innocuous in
another. They should not be subjected to the possibility of long prison sentences or
even death in some states for behavior that may be punishable by only fines or short
jail sentences in others, or not even punishable at all. The time has come when the
lawyers should attempt to bring some order out of the chaotic profusion and varieu/
of sex offender laws that now obtains.
The revision of sex offender laws, however, will require much more than the
mere elimination of disparities and differences among the several states; it must also
consider the fact that many of the existing prohibitions, no matter how widespread,
are inherently unenforceable and should be abandoned. Police and prosecuting
officials may successfully investigate and prosecute criminal cases where a victim
makes a complaint or where the criminal activity is more or less overt in character.
But sexual activity is largely private. There is no victim to make a complaint in the
ordinary case of fornication, adultery, or deviant heterosexual or homosexual activity.
Despite criminal sanctions, therefore, sexual misbehavior of this sort, when carried on
privately and discreetly, is practically never punished. It is only the rare unfortunate
offender who comes to the attention of the authorities; and although he is no more
guilty than the hundreds of thousands of others who have freely indulged in similar
kinds of sexual activity, he is pilloried because he was caught. Should police and
prosecuting officials be burdened with enforcing such laws against such offenders?
A rational code of sex offender laws would, moreover, basically revise some of our
'2E.g., CoN. GEN. STAT. Rav. § 53-226 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 731 (1953); FLA. STAT.
§ 796.07 (Supp. 1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-203 (1953); Tax. PEN. ConE art. 607(20) (1948); Wyo.
CoMp. STAT. ANN. § 9-508 (1945).
20E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-23X (1958); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 162 (957); INn. ANN.
STAT. § 10-4219 (1956); WYo. CoMPv. STAT. ANN. § 9-517 (1945).
27 Cf. State v. Rayburn, 170 Iowa 514, 153 N.W. 59 (915).
2'E.g., In. ANN. STAT. § 10-4220 (1956); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 9-518 (1945).
" E.g., IOWA CODE § 724.1 (1958). For a summary survey of the penalties imposed by the prostitu-
tion statutes of the several states, see SHERWIN, op. cit. supra note 7, pt. 2, chart 4 A, at 68.
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present concepts in this area. Thus, for example, although force, violence, and over-
powering of the will of a female by violence, threat, or fear of bodily harm would
continue to be the core of the crime of rape, it is to be hoped that the new formula-
tion would not comprehend those cases where a man may have used considerable
effort to persuade a woman to engage in coitus with him, where this was the normal
and expected outcome of their association together. Moreover, since most rape
convictions involve consensual acts of coitus with young girls, with no element of
force or violence, it has long been apparent that the legal age of consent must be
reduced. Many girls of fifteen, sixteen, and seventeen years of age voluntarily
enter sexual relations with men and boys. Each such sexual contact may technically
be rape under some law and may subject the male involved to ferocious penalties,
although except for the age of the girl involved, the act may be no different than
fornication.
At common law, the lack of appreciation and understanding by a child under ten
years of the nature and quality of the sexual act-and her consequent inability to
consent to it-was justifiably assimilated to the force and violence and overpower-
ing of the will in the traditional definition of the crime of rape. In our desire to
shield young women from sexual experience, we have extended the age limits up-
ward. It is absurd in our culture, however, to talk of young women of middle or
late adolescence not having knowledge and appreciation of the sexual act. Such
knowledge is usually acquired by the time of puberty. The law should, accordingly,
take a more realistic view and fix the age of consent at fourteen years, instead of the
higher limits that are more commonly found. Should the legislator wish to protect
the morals of young women over fourteen years of age, this can be done by means
other than branding as a rapist every male who may dally with them.
But whether or not the age of consent is reduced, it is imperative that the lack
of chastity of the young woman be deemed a defense to a charge of statutory rape.
It is ridiculous for the police to charge with rape every male who may have had
sexual contact with a promiscuous young woman or a young prostitute. The law
should, moreover, take into account the age of the male involved in defining this
offense. Boys and girls of similar ages engage in many forms of sex activity, and if
this leads to coitus, the boy should not necessarily be exposed to penal sanctions.
Also vitally essential in any revision of sex offender laws is a reconsideration
of the evidentiary rules, so as to minimize the possibility of convicting innocent de-
fendants. Complaints of sex offenses are easily made. They spring from a variety
of motives and reasons. The psychiatrist and the psychoanalyst would have a field
day were he to examine all complaints of rape, sexual tampering with children, incest,
homosexual behavior with young boys, deviant sex behavior, etc., in any given com-
munity. He would find that complaints are too often made of sexual misbehavior
that has occurred only in the overripe fantasies of the so-called victims. Frequently,
the more or less unconscious wish for the sexual experience is converted into the
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experience itself. Sometimes, too, the so-called victim will charge not the one with
whom he or she has had the sexual experience, but someone else who is entirely
innocent. Prosecuting attorneys must continually be on guard for the charge of
sex offense brought by the spurned female that has as its underlying basis a desire
for revenge, or a blackmail or shakedown scheme.
Where the law permits, as it does with respect to many sex offenses, a conviction
on the uncorroborated testimony of a complainant, it puts a premium on unfounded
complaints. There is no barrier against convicting the innocent, except the good
sense of prosecuting attorneys, courts, and jurors. But the moral indignation that
is stirred up by a recital of dastardly behavior apparently often overrides good
sense, and as a result, far too many men have been railroaded on sex offense charges.
Accordingly, no conviction on a sex offense charge should be had where the testimony
of the so-called victim is not corroborated by "other material evidence." It is true
that such a requirement may result in guilty men escaping just punishment in cases
where other evidence is not available. But the dangers involved to innocence where
the law makes it possible to imprison a man on the uncorroborated testimony of a
,disturbed child or spiteful woman outweigh the necessity for obtaining convictions
in sex offense cases.
Any revision of sex offender laws must also repeal much of the sexual psychopath
legislation that is presently in force. These laws were passed to provide a means for
-dealing with dangerous, repetitive, mentally abnormal sex offenders. Unfortunately,
the vagueness of the definition of sexual psychopaths contained in these statutes has
obscured this basic underlying purpose. There are large numbers of sex offenders
who engage in compulsive, repetitive sexual acts, which may be crimes, who may
be mentally abnormal, but who are not dangerous. The transvestite, the exhi-
bitionist, the frotteur, the homosexual who masturbates another either in the privacy
of his bedroom or in a public toilet, the "peeping tom"-are typical of large
numbers of sex offenders who are threatened with long-term incarceration by present
-sexual psychopath legislation. And what is even worse is that such legislation has
not usually been implemented by facilities for treatment. The result is that many
nuisance-type, nondangerous sex offenders have been imprisoned for long periods
,of time, without treatment, in those jurisdictions where such laws have been en-
forced. This is not to say that the compulsive nondangerous types of sex offenders
should be immune from prosecution and punishment; but short sentences or proba-
tion are more than adequate to deal with these derelictions, unless better treatment
facilities are provided.
In scooping up minor compulsive sex offenders, moreover, sight has been lost
'of the basic objective of sexual psychopath laws-namely to provide long-term incar-
,ceration for dangerous, repetitive sex offenders. Such offenders will be found pri-
marily among those who show a pattern of using children as sexual objects and
:those whose sex offenses are marked by incidents of sadism and brutality. Such
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individuals can be dealt with just as effectively by traditional methods of law en-
forcement as under sexual psychopath laws. Obviously, the law should provide
long-term prison sentences for dangerous sex offenders-up to life imprisonment, if
necessary. It should permit such offenders to be paroled only on a showing of
demonstrated improvement and rehabilitation. It should permit such offenders
liberty only under the continued supervision of a parole officer and should facilitate
their re-incarceration, if they exhibit signs of relapse into the kinds of sexual mis-
behavior that brought about their incarceration in the first instance.
These are but a few of the many problems that must be met in any revision of sex
offender laws. Many have already been considered by the American Law Institute in
its Model Penal Code project30 The specific recommendations that have eventuated
cannot be analyzed here, but they deserve consideration by those interested in more
rational sex offender legislation. The Institute'is to be commended for undertaking
so controversial a task that characteristically generates far too much heat, stirs en-
tirely too much emotion. Radical departures from existing law in this area con-
ceivably may imperil the acceptance of the Model Penal Code as a whole, and
caution might have dictated the deletion of sex offenses from the agenda. Accord-
ingly, it is to the credit of the Institute that it has met the challenge openly and is
laying the basis for a more rational code of sex offender laws than is to be found on
the statute books of any state.
"o MODEL PENAL CODE art. 207 (Tent. Draft. No. 4, 1955; Tent. Draft. No. 9, x959).
